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Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of corporate governance of the “new” Parmalat, born in the aftermath of the infamous 
financial scandal, and aims at verifying if this new model of governance can be considered a best practice for Italian listed 
companies. Many papers have already highlighted that the Parmalat scandal was facilitated by bad governance which did 
not have an efficient system for the safeguarding of creditors and minority shareholders in presence of a family 
corporation. 
This paper presents the results of the comparison between the “old” and “new” rules of Parmalat corporate governance, 
highlighting the considerable differences in the composition and functions of the various company bodies. Moreover, an 
in-depth analysis of the efficacy of the external and internal control systems is also provided. The main points of strength 
which make it possible to consider the new Parmalat as a model of best practice in Italy are identified, although critical 
aspects are also pointed out. The paper concludes by making suggestions aimed at strengthening the model of corporate 
governance of Italian listed companies. 
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1. Introduction 
Parmalat is an Italian worldwide leading diary company whose financial scandal that broke out in 
December 2003 was widely covered by both the national and international press due to the fact that it was the 
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biggest ever financial scandal in European corporate history (Buchanan, Yang, 2005). The Parmalat crisis was 
an opportunity for international researchers, media, etc. to study the Italian governance system. As a matter of 
fact, Italian governance had not previously been studied, therefore the case made it necessary to face the 
various critical aspects of governance in Europe compared with American and Aglosaxon model of 
governance. Parmalat is now a public company, and five years after the financial scandal it is striving to 
regain the trust of the markets, also by means of a governance model that is in keeping with the highest 
national and international standards. With reference to the Italian corporate governance system it was 
“historically considered poor, characterized by an inactive takeover market, weak accounting standards, 
limited presence of institutional investor and where the legal protection for investors was low” (Buchanan and 
al.). Besides, the Italian corporate governance system is characterised by a high degree of direct ownership 
concentration, both for listed and unlisted companies (Bianco, Casavola, 1999 and Enriques, Volpin, 2007). 
The Italian corporate governance system may be classified in the Latin sub-group (De Jong, 1999). However, 
it has its own unique features, and does not entirely fit into the international standards models (Melis, 1999) . 
Finally the Italian corporate governance system is based on pyramidal firm structure. According to La Porta 
ed al. (2000) the strongest corporate governance system is the Anglosaxon one that offers the highest level of 
legal protection to stockholders. 
The Parmalat scandal has been a case study for different authors who explained, under different point of 
views, the reasons for the crisis focusing on the first cause of the Parmalat financial fraud: the corporate 
governance system. Melis (2005) showed that there was a huge concentration of power in a sole person in 
Parmalat. In fact, the controlling shareholder was able to hold the positions of Chairman and CEO of Parmalat 
Finanziaria. As Melis stated (2000) the high level of concentration of power in non financial listed companies 
is an Italian critical issue. Moreover, the author showed that Parmalat Corporate Governance wasn’t able to 
comply with some of the key existing Italian Corporate Governance standards of best practice, such as the 
presence of independent directors, the composition of the board of directors and, especially, of the internal 
control committee. Buchanan and al. showed how Parmalat’s failure was linked to “governance failures with 
particular reference to the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholder and the minority 
shareholders”. The authors sentenced that “the Parmalat bankruptcy was the result of the failed proper 
corporate governance, not inevitable business decline”. McCahery and Vermeulen (2005) focused their paper 
on Parmalat as it was an extremely unique case with reference to Special purpose entities (SPEs). In fact 
“management used a virtual hydra head of offshore subsidiaries and special purpose entities to cover up their 
losses and prop up the financial situation of the group”. Besides the Parmalat scandal was used by the author 
to exemplify the importance of the variety of legal techniques to curb related party transactions. Also Tabasso 
(2004) underlined that the Parmalat “fiasco” demonstrated the ineffectiveness of prevention and controls in 
many critical areas of the corporate world, prompting a serious reappraisal of self-regulation codes and legal 
standards. An analysis of the financial and economic aspects of the Consolidated Financial Statement of 
Parmalat during the four-year period 1998-2002 showed that there were some critical accounting areas that 
were not observed by the Parmalat controlling bodies (Bava and Devalle, 2004). The biggest financial scandal 
in Italy (an example of worst practice of corporate governance) gives rise to an analysis of the governance 
rules of the “new” Parmalat, which were defined following the group’s restructuring process with the main 
aim of regaining the trust of the markets and becoming a model of best practice. This paper does not intend to 
analyze whether the Italian rules of Corporate Governance are a best practice in Europe, but it aims at 
verifying whether, in the Italian Corporate Governance system, the “new” Parmalat governance can be 
considered a best practice of governance. Thus, this paper presents the results of the comparison between the 
“old” and “new” rules of Parmalat corporate governance, highlighting the considerable differences in the 
composition and functions of the company bodies. The Parmalat Group underwent a in-depth restructuring 
process with the main aim of regaining the trust of the markets and became the first public company 
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(Bonicelli E. (2007), Parmalat public company, Il Sole 24 ore, Milano) in Italy without a strong blockholder 
and without a trade union agreement.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of Italy’s Corporate 
Governance System and the question research. The Parmalat Case Study is presented in Section 3. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the findings and some indications regarding future development. 
2. Backround and question research  
Italian corporate governance framework and rules have been substantially modified since 1998 with the 
introduction of the Draghi Law.  More in general, Corporate Governance Reforms in Europe have been driven 
by three factors (Enriques, Volpin, 2007). First, Kamar (2006) stated that reforms aimed to make national 
markets more attractive. Secondly (Ferran, 2004) the efforts of the European Union was to institute a common 
framework of rules. Thirdly many of the corporate governance reforms are a response to national and 
international financial frauds and scandals (Enrique, 2003). These events have clearly shown the weakness of 
the worldwide and Italian corporate governance framework for both listed and non listed companies. 
Therefore, in order to rectify the situation appropriately, the legislator, has tried to protect minority 
shareholders of listed companies.  
Then the aim of this paper is to analyse if Parmalat could be considered a best practice of corporate 
governance in Italy by an analysis of the new and old model of governance.  
To reach the objectives described the research question is the following: 
(Q1) is the “new” parmalat model of corporate governance a best practice in Italy after the its financial 
scandal? 
3. Data and methodology 
The analysis is based on the Parmalat case. In particular, we have analysed the corporate governance 
system before and after the financial scandal. Then we compared the Parmalat model of corporate governance 
with the international Code of Corporate governance. Information were collected from the Parmalat corporate 
governance report with reference to 2010 and 2005. 
4. Results 
In order to deal with the Parmalat crisis, at the end of December 2003 the Italian government issued a 
decree law 347/2003 (the “Parmalat decree”) to save the Italian Group from bankruptcy. The law introduced a 
series of derogations from the 1999 “Prodi-bis decree” and, above all, accelerated extraordinary 
administration proceedings. The special commissioner, Mr Bondi, presented a Parmalat group industrial and 
restructuring plan to the Minister of Industry and to the main trade unions in the agro-food sector  (on 20 July 
2004). The principal aim of the plan was to free Parmalat from its debts, given that the company, although 
vulnerable, had a positive operating margin and could therefore be self-sustaining. 
The plan emphasized the good prospects of the divisions identified as constituting the core business of the 
future Parmalat - UHT milk, fresh milk, milk derivatives and fruit juices - and envisaged the creation of a 
joint-stock company that would take over the assets of the 16 companies of the Parmalat group and pay their 
creditors . Regarding Parmalat’s debts, the new company would pay its secured creditors (the inland revenue, 
workers, artisans etc.) in cash, while paying all others with shares proportional to their claims against one or 
more of the 16 companies. The Italian government also provided assistance with the solution by giving 
84   Fabrizio Bava and Alain Devalle /  Procedia Economics and Finance  2 ( 2012 )  81 – 90 
creditor farm and haulage businesses, which had been affected by the crisis, access to credit on especially 
good terms.  
On the 17th May 2004, Parmalat Finanziaria S.p.A. announced the corporate governance system of the 
New Parmalat in the document outlining the restructuring plan. The new system took into account the norms 
regarding company law, Consob’s recommendations and the Code of Corporate Governance of the Italian 
Stock Exchange. It was also in keeping with the best national and international practices. The aim of the 
corporate governance system is to protect and create value over time for the shareholders and other parties 
concerned. This aim is increased to the rank of “statutory principle” due to the fact that it is placed among the 
duties of the institutions. 
4.1. The Corporate Governance of “New Parmalat” 
Parmalat’s corporate organization is based on the so-called Italian “conventional” model (shown in 
paragraph 2). The corporate governance model also includes a series of powers, delegations of power, and 
internal control procedures, as well as the Parmalat Code of Conduct, a Code of Ethics, the Internal Dealing 
Handling Code and the Organization, Management and Control Model required by Legislative Decree 
231/2001. The Bylaws have a particularly significant role in the Parmalat corporate governance model 
because it acknowledges some of the best practices of corporate governance, such as the obligation to set up 
committees within the Board of Directors, the separation of the CEO and the Chairman and the fact that the 
majority of the Directors must be independent. 
4.2. Shareholder base 
Parmalat, as mentioned above, was a family company with ownership concentration in only one person. 
On the contrary, “New Parmalat” is a company with a dispersed ownership that is a typical situation in the 
Anglo-Saxon and American companies. When defining the new governance rules it is necessary to consider 
that, if governance must be outlined taking into account the characteristics of the shareholders, it must also 
take into account that the structure of the public company was temporary  as Parmalat was acquired by 
Lactalis in 2011. The shareholders listed in Table 3 below are believed to own, either directly or through 
representatives, nominees or subsidiaries, an interest in the Company that is greater than 2% of the voting 
shares. 
Table 2.  Shareholder with more than 2% of the voting shares 
Shareholder Percentage 
FIR TREE INC. 2,287% 
UBS AG 2,382% 
MACKENZIE CUNDILL INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LTD 2,348% 
GOLDMAN SACHS ASSET MANAGEMENT L.P. 2,013% 
INTESA SANPAOLO SPA 2,438% 
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. CORPORATION 3,026% 
Total shareholders with significant equity interest 14,494% 
    Source: Consob – 27.10.2008 
 
Shareholder Percentage 
MACKENZIE CUNDILL INVESTMENTS MANAGEMENT 
LTD 
7,557% 
BLACKROCK, INC. 4,945% 
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SKAGEN AS 5,009% 
TOTALE GRUPPO INTESA S. PAOLO 2,321% 
NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 2,023% 
Total shareholders with significant equity interest 21,86% 
    Source: Consob – 18.08.2011 
4.3. Board of Directors 
The Company is managed by a Board of Directors  comprising 11 Directors, who are elected from slates of 
candidates. Only shareholders who, alone or together with other shareholders, hold a number of shares equal 
in the aggregate to at least 1% of the Company’s shares that convey the right to vote at Regular Shareholders’ 
Meetings are entitled to file slates of candidates. The Bylaws that require a rather low threshold, necessary to 
be able to present a slate is equal to 1% and aims at making it easier for minority shareholders to present a 
slate. The Bylaws require that the appointment of two directors is assigned by the slate presented by the 
minority shareholders . 
Table 3.  The structure of the Board of Directors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
The Bylaws establish that the Chairman of the Board of Directors is never allowed to combine his or her 
office with that of Managing Director . This is a significant aspect, as such a separation is established by the 
Bylaws and complies with best governance acknowledged on an international scale . Currently, at the time of 
writing this report, no management powers have been delegated to the Chairman of the Board of Directors 
and he does not perform a specific function in the development of Company strategies.  
Table 4.  Old and New Corporate Governance about the Board of Directors 
Board of Directors New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Number of components 
of the  Board of Directors 
11 (the number of Directors  established by 
the Bylaws) 
The Bylaws established a number 
of between five and fifteen 
Directors 
Election procedure Slates of candidates. Threshold equal to at 
least 1% of the Company’s shares 
The presentation of the slate was 
not required prior to the meeting 
Process Presentation at least 10 days beforehand: Not established 
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 official acceptance of the candidates; 
 certification that there is no legal 
reason to prevent the election of the 
candidate; 
 certification of necessary requisites; 
 curriculum vitae. 
Independent Directors 9 (at least 6 in compliance with the  Bylaws) 3 (according to the statements 
found in the annual report on 
corporate governance) 
Corporate Governance 
Posts  
The same person may not serve both as 
Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief 
Executive Officer 
Allowed 
Board Evaluation The board evaluation process was carried out 
by requesting that all members fill out a 
questionnaire.  
Not established 
4.5. Committees of the Board of Directors  
The establishments of Parmalat Internal Committees, is governed by the Bylaws. This is important 
considering the fact that in Italy the creation of committees within the Board of Directors is not required by 
law but simply by the code of corporate governance. The rules governing the operation of the Committees are 
approved by the Board of Directors which can also integrated or modified them. The Board of Directors has 
established several internal committees that provide consulting support and submit proposals to the Board of 
Directors. The Board of Directors is informed about the activities of these Committees whenever a Board 
meeting is held. 
These Committees are: 
- Litigation Committee; 
- Nominations and Compensation Committee; 
- Internal Control and Corporate Governance Committee.                             
Table 5.  Features of New Parmalat’s Internal Committee 
 New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Internal 
Committees  
The establishments of Internal Committees 
is governed by Bylaws. 
These committees are: 
 Litigation Committee; 
 Nominations and Compensation 
Committee; 
 Internal Control and Corporate 
Governance Committee. 
The following had been set up: 
 the Internal Control Committee 
 the Compensation Committee 
Compensation of 
the Board of 
Directors 
The compensation of the Board of Directors 
is determined by the Shareholder’s Meeting 
and does not change until the Shareholder’s 
Meeting approves a new resolution. 
The compensation of the Board of Directors 
is determined by the Shareholder’s Meeting 
and does not change until the Shareholder’s 
Meeting approves a new resolution. 
 
The Litigation Committee, which comprises three independent Directors without executive authority  
provides consulting support to the Chief Executive Officer on litigation related to the insolvency of the 
companies included in the Composition with Creditors. The Corporate Counsel of Parmalat SpA attends the 
meetings of this Committee. The opinions rendered by the Committee with regard to individual issues in 
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litigation are also forwarded to the Board of Directors ahead of the meeting that has the issues in question on 
its Agenda.  
 
The features of New Parmalat’s Internal Committee compared with the previous ones are shown in Table 6 
below: 
Table 6.  The Litigation Commitee 
 New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Composition Three independent Directors without executive authority Not established 
Nomination The Bylaws establish that at least one of its members 
must be drawn from a minority slate 
Function Provides consulting support to the CEO on litigation 
related to the insolvency of the companies included in the 
Composition with Creditors. 
The Nominations and Compensation Committee, which has three independent members  performs a 
proposal-making function.  
The features of New Parmalat’s Nominations and Compensation Committee compared with the previous 
ones are shown in Table 6 below: 
Table 7. The nominations and Compensation Committee 
 New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Composition Three independent Directors without executive 
authority.  
The Bylaws establish that the majority of the 
members of this committee shall be independent 
Directors. 
It was solely a Compensation 
Committee.  
Nomination The Bylaws establish that  at least one of its members 
must be drawn from a minority slate. 
It was composed of three members: 
two were independent and one had 
executive authority. 
The Internal Control and Corporate Governance Committee, which comprises three independent Directors 
without executive authority (this composition is established by the Bylaws), performs a consulting and 
proposal-making function. Sessions of the Committee are attended by the Chairman of the Board of Statutory 
Auditors . 
 
Table 8. The Internal Control and Corporate Governance Committee 
Old Parmalat New Parmalat 
Composition Three independent Directors without executive 
authority 
Sessions of the Committee are attended by the 
Chairman of the Board of Statutory Auditors. 
Two were independent 
and one had  executive 
authority. 
Nomination The Bylaws establish that at least one of its 
members must be drawn from a minority slate 
By the Board of 
Directors  
4.6. Internal Control System 
The Company’s internal control system is designed to ensure the efficient management of its corporate and 
business affairs, to make management decisions that are transparent and verifiable, to provide reliable 
88   Fabrizio Bava and Alain Devalle /  Procedia Economics and Finance  2 ( 2012 )  81 – 90 
accounting and operating information, to ensure compliance with the applicable statutes, to protect the 
Company’s integrity, and to prevent fraud against the Company and the financial markets in general. 
Table 9. The Internal Control and Corporate Governance Committee 
4.7. Independent Auditors 
Parmalat auditor firm is one of a Big Four Company. 
4.8. Manager in charge of preparing company’s financial report 
The Manager in charge of preparing company’s financial report must have served as a corporate executive 
for at least 5 years and he had to work in the accounting or control area or served in another management 
function at a corporation with a share capital of at least 2 million Euros.  
In addiction he must meet the law’s standards of integrity and professionalism (these requirements are set 
out by the Bylaws). 
4.9. Statutory Auditors 
The Board of Statutory Auditors comprises three Statutory Auditors and two Alternates, all of whom are 
elected on the basis of slates of candidates to ensure that a Statutory Auditor and an Alternate are elected by 
minority shareholders . Only shareholders who, alone or together with other shareholders, hold a number of 
shares equal in the aggregate to at least 1% of the Company’s shares that convey the right to vote at Regular 
Shareholders’ Meetings are entitled to file slates of candidates . 
Table 10. Statutory Auditors 
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Board of Directoris New Parmalat Old Parmalat 
Number of components  3 3 
Election procedure Slates of candidates – Threshold equal to  
at least 1% of the Company’s shares 
 
Chairmanship of the Statutory Board goes 
to the first candidate on the list that is 
second for the number of votes 
Slates of candidates – Threshold equal to 
at least 3% of the Company’s shares 
 
Chairmanship of the Statutory Board 
goes to the first candidate on the list that 
is first for the number of votes 
Process Presentation at least 10 days beforehand: 
 official acceptance of the 
candidates; 
 certification that there is no legal 
reason to prevent the election of the 
candidate; 
 certification of necessary requisites 
 curriculum vitae 
Presentation at least 10 days beforehand: 
 official acceptance of the 
candidates; 
 certification that there is no legal 
reason to prevent the election of 
the candidate; 
 certification of necessary requisites 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our research reflects the currently hotly debated issue of corporate governance, which was recently 
sparked off once more by the crisis of the financial markets. Following the Parmalat crisis, there have been 
many changes to the laws and regulations and code of corporate governance in Italy, with the aim of 
strengthening the governance system of listed companies. In order to provide the restructuring process of the 
Parmalat group has been necessary to totally rethink the Corporate Governance since New Parmalat was born 
with the main objective of regaining the trust from the market that they had lost. This issue has generated an 
interest in the “Parmalat Case”, and is the subject of this paper, which highlights the main characteristics of 
the new governance model, identifying the numerous positive aspects which, in some cases, have been 
accepted by the legislator and integrated in the reform on the Savings Law. So this paper does not intend to 
analyze whether the Italian rules of Corporate Governance are a best practice in Europe, but aims at verifying 
whether the “New” Parmalat governance could be considered a best practice of governance in the Italian 
Corporate Governance system. Within the Italian listed companies framework it can thus be stated that New 
Parmalat’s corporate governance model has many of the characteristics that make it a best practice model. 
Moreover, each model can always be modified and improved upon, in order to optimise the costs in economic 
terms with the benefits. The simply complying with corporate governance rules does not automatically mean 
that the company is being run correctly. Good governance can be obtained by striking the right balance 
between compliance to the rules and attention to performance (Riccaboni A., Guindani P., 2008). In this 
framework, the financial community plays an important role, as Financial investors and market operators have 
to consider the monitoring of the short-term results to be not the only important aspect, as it is necessary in 
the meantime to evaluate the ability of the Company to create value in a long term period, following an ethical 
behavior, and satisfying the stakeholders’ interests (Riccaboni A., Guindani P., 2008). 
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